Aller au contenu principal
Avis sur l’édition source anglaiseCette page reste accessible pour la navigation, mais elle suit encore l’édition source anglaise et sa traduction n’a pas encore été révisée.
Middle East Lobbying and Influence — Overview

Middle East Lobbying and Influence — Overview

We will tell you, honestly and with links to primary filings, how much each Middle Eastern state has spent on direct lobbying and institutional influence in the United States, and we will explain why the distribution of that spending matters.

OZJF is an American advocacy organization. This section exists because foreign influence operations targeting United States institutions deserve public scrutiny, and because the American public conversation about foreign lobbying is unusually narrow. When most readers hear the phrase “Middle East lobby,” they think of a single country. The filings tell a broader story, and we think the broader story is worth reading in full.

We are not making accusations. We are reading the public record. The public record, in this case, comes from four main places: the Department of Justice’s FARA eFile database, the U.S. Department of Education’s Section 117 foreign gifts and contracts disclosures, the Government Accountability Office’s audit work on those disclosures (see GAO-24-106856), and the aggregated reporting curated by journalists and researchers at OpenSecrets Foreign Lobby Watch. Readers who want the statutory framework explained in plain English should start with the Congressional Research Service’s legal overview of FARA. These are the same sources congressional staff, national-security reporters, and university compliance officers use. They are not partisan artifacts. They are filings.

Four Categories of Influence

Before any numbers, the categories have to be clear. First, direct FARA-registered lobbying captures foreign principals, meaning foreign governments, state-owned enterprises, state-owned media, and foreign political parties, paying U.S. firms or individuals to influence U.S. policy. Second, institutional funding captures contracts and gifts to U.S. universities, think tanks, museums, and civil-society organizations. For universities, this is disclosed under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act. Third, state-owned media operations inside the United States are themselves FARA-registrable in most configurations. Fourth, and distinctly, domestic citizen lobbying by U.S. nationals and U.S.-funded organizations is regulated under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), not FARA. That fourth category is legally and morally different from the first three, and we treat it that way.

The Qatar-Versus-Israel Comparison

The single cleanest illustration of why this section exists is the contrast between Qatar and Israel. Using OZJF’s internal estimates synthesized from FARA filings and Section 117 disclosures, and described here as estimates rather than audited figures, Israel’s cumulative direct FARA-registered foreign-principal lobbying in the United States is on the order of $212 million. Qatar’s cumulative figure, combining FARA-registered direct lobbying and Section 117-disclosed higher-education gifts and contracts, is on the order of $6.86 billion. Qatar is a state of roughly three million people, established in 1971. Israel is a state of roughly ten million people, established in 1948. On a per-capita basis, the Qatar figure works out to roughly $2,280 per Qatari citizen. The Israeli figure works out to roughly $21 per Israeli citizen. Those are estimates. Each country page re-derives them from primary filings and shows its work.

We flag the per-capita comparison because the per-capita frame undoes a common rhetorical move. People sometimes argue that of course a small, contested state like Israel would lobby hard in Washington. Qatar is a much smaller state than Israel and is lobbying approximately a hundred times harder per citizen, and almost nobody is talking about it.

What We Are and Are Not Saying

We are not saying Qatari funding of American universities is proof of wrongdoing. Educational philanthropy by foreign states is legal, disclosed, and extremely common. We are saying that when a single foreign state becomes the largest Section-117-disclosed foreign source of gifts and contracts to U.S. higher education over the disclosure window, congressional oversight is appropriate, journalistic scrutiny is appropriate, and so is a public research page such as this one. The GAO has repeatedly found that the Department of Education’s monitoring of Section 117 disclosures has been uneven, as documented in GAO-24-106856. Readers can draw their own conclusions. We are showing the filings.

We are also not saying Israeli lobbying does not exist. It does. Israel’s page documents every FARA-registered Israeli principal we can identify. The U.S.-Israel relationship is a central American alliance, supported by OZJF on policy grounds, and that relationship includes public-diplomacy spending just like every other major alliance the United States maintains. Disclosure is disclosure. Israel’s FARA footprint is small relative to Qatar’s combined footprint, and that is a factual observation, not a normative one.

AIPAC Is Not On This List

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is a U.S. citizen organization, funded by U.S. donors, registered under the LDA. It does not receive funding or direction from the Government of Israel. It is therefore not a FARA-registered foreign principal, and it is not in this section’s leaderboard. We explain the legal distinction and the history on the AIPAC page. Critics of AIPAC should critique it for what it actually is, a powerful American citizen lobby, not for something it is not.

Country Pages

The section’s country-specific pages are organized alphabetically. Start with Qatar for the largest combined footprint, and Israel for the state whose lobbying is most often discussed. The Congressional Research Service’s country-specific reports, including CRS R44533 on Qatar and CRS RL33476 on Israel, are useful companion reading. Additional country pages will follow, covering Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, each built from the same four-category framework.

Methodology and Corrections

Every number on every page in this section has a last-verified date, a link to a primary filing, and a methodology note describing what the number includes and excludes. We invite corrections. If we have a number wrong, we want to fix it. The corrections page explains how to submit one. We would rather be corrected than confident.

We are just asking questions. The questions are, who is paying whom, for what, and what does the public record actually say. The answers are in the filings.

Parcourir cette rubrique

Commencez par les pages les plus importantes.

01Israel — Lobbying and Influence in the United StatesThis page shows every Israel-registered FARA principal we can find, link to the filings, and explain what those filings mean.02Qatar — Lobbying and Influence in the United StatesWe will give a sourced, conservative accounting of Qatari direct FARA-registered lobbying, Qatari state-media activity in the United States, and Qatari gifts and contracts reported under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act.03Arabie saoudite : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLe bilan de l’influence saoudienne aux États-Unis importe, car le royaume occupe une place centrale dans la diplomatie régionale tout en maintenant depuis longtemps à Washington des activités déclarées de relations publiques et de lobbying.04Émirats arabes unis : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLes Émirats arabes unis comptent parce qu'ils sont un partenaire majeur des États-Unis et disposent actuellement d'un réseau d'influence déclaré au titre du FARA, faisant appel à plusieurs cabinets et s'étendant du Congrès à la diplomatie publique.05Iran : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisL’Iran fait l’objet d’un régime complet de sanctions américaines, si bien que son empreinte au titre du FARA est presque nulle. Le dossier existant se résume à une courte liste d’affaires pénales et à un long litige judiciaire. Voici ce qu’il montre, et ce qu’il ne montre pas.06Turquie : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLa Turquie est une alliée des États-Unis au sein de l’OTAN, dont le gouvernement de l’ère Erdoğan a mené aux États-Unis des opérations d’influence agressives, parfois criminelles, désormais renforcées par une forte hausse des dépenses liées à TURKEN entre 2023 et 2025.07Égypte : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisL'Égypte consacre moins d'argent au lobbying direct aux États-Unis que les États du Golfe comparables, mais elle maintient une équipe professionnelle à Washington pour protéger environ 1,3 milliard de dollars d'aide militaire américaine par an. Un sénateur américain en exercice a été reconnu coupable en 2024 d'avoir agi comme agent étranger de l'Égypte. Voici ce que montrent les documents publics.08Jordanie : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLa Jordanie maintient une équipe professionnelle de lobbying à Washington pour préserver environ 1,45 milliard de dollars d'aide américaine par an. L'essentiel de cette activité est ordinaire, déclaré et consigné dans des dossiers publics. Voici ce que montrent les documents.09Irak : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisL’Irak mène deux démarches parallèles de lobbying à Washington : l’une pour le gouvernement fédéral à Bagdad et l’autre, distincte, pour le Gouvernement régional du Kurdistan.10Syrie : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLe bilan FARA de la Syrie est depuis longtemps presque nul en raison des sanctions. La chute du régime Assad en 2024 et l'allègement partiel des sanctions en 2025 pourraient changer la donne.11Koweït : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisUn examen clair de l’empreinte du lobbying koweïtien à Washington, de la célèbre campagne de relations publiques de 1990 et de ce que révèle aujourd’hui le registre FARA.12Liban : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLe Liban présente simultanément deux volets d’influence : une très faible empreinte étatique au titre du FARA et un volet parallèle, bien plus vaste, autour du Hezbollah. Les États-Unis les traitent séparément, et les lecteurs devraient en faire autant.13Bahreïn : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisComment Bahreïn, qui accueille la cinquième flotte américaine, a eu recours à des lobbyistes à Washington, de la répression de 2011 à l’ère des accords d’Abraham.14Oman : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisComment Oman, discret médiateur du Golfe, s'appuie sur une présence limitée à Washington pour jouer un rôle majeur en coulisses, de l'accord de 1980 sur l'accès aux installations à l'accueil des premiers pourparlers nucléaires entre les États-Unis et l'Iran.15Yémen : lobbying et influence aux États-UnisLe Yémen est un État fragmenté dont l’empreinte FARA est presque inexistante. Le véritable débat sur la politique yéménite à Washington passe par les canaux saoudiens, émiratis et de lutte contre le terrorisme, ainsi que par les revirements concernant la désignation des Houthis.16AIPAC — Why It Is a Citizen Lobby, Not a Foreign AgentA clear, sourced walk-through of (1) AIPAC's legal status, (2) the predecessor organizations and conditions that led to its founding, and (3) the functional difference between a FARA-registered foreign principal's lobbyist and a domestic citizen lobby.